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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v, : 
TOMAS R. HERRERA, : Case No- 920209 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
and : 
MIKELL SWEEZEY, : Case No, 920265 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 11 
INTRODUCTION 
The insanity defense has been firmly established in the 
criminal law in this country since the adoption of the federal 
constitution, A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (1967) 
(hereinafter "Goldstein"); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 929 (Idaho 
1990) (McDevitt, J,, dissenting); Jacques Quen, Psychiatry and the 
Law: Historical Relevance Today in L. Freedman, By Reason of 
Insanity: Essays on Psychiatry and the Law# 143, 154-7 (1987). 
While the defense has been subject to the "evolving aims of the 
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and 
medical views of the nature of man" (see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514, 535-6 (1968)), the basic premise that insane individuals are 
not criminally culpable has been a part of this nation's criminal 
law jurisprudence throughout the nation's history. 
Although the concept of insanity has evolved, until the 
Hinckley verdict, that evolution consisted of broadening the defense 
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as our understanding of mental processes progressed. See Goldstein 
at 19, 96-7; discussion infra at 14-15 regarding evolution of 
insanity defense in Utah. Until 1983, criticism of the M'Naqhten 
defense revolved around the narrow definition of insanity under 
M'Naqhten and the failure of the M'Naqhten rule to provide an 
insanity defense to all persons who should not be held criminally 
culpable based on mental illness. Goldstein at 11, 46-7; Wayne 
LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law 446 (1986) (hereinafter "LaFave"). 
The controversy surrounding the Hinckley verdict is similar 
to the controversy surrounding the M'Naqhten verdict in 1843.1 See 
1. Despite the public outcry following the Hinckley verdict, it 
should be kept in mind that the insanity plea is "rarely used and 
even more rarely successful." R. D. MacKay, Post-Hinckley Insanity 
in the U.S.A., 1988 Crim. L. Rev. 88, 89 fn. 10, citing Pasewark, 
"A Review of Research on the Insanity Defense" (1986), 477 Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 100. 
Historically, the majority of acquittals by reason of insanity have 
appeared to be uncontested or stipulated. See Goldstein at 23. 
Only a very small percentage of criminal defendants who go to trial 
plead not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGBRI"). Goldstein at 22. 
Establishing the defense at trial can be very difficult given the 
fact that usually only more serious offenders assert the defense, 
and the defendant, who must be competent to stand trial, may well 
appear sane to the jury at the time of trial. Goldstein at 19, 23-4. 
Furthermore, the public's perceived abuse of the insanity 
defense following the Hinckley verdict reflects a widespread 
misperception of the treatment of individuals found NGBRI. As 
Goldstein pointed out: 
[IInsanity has become a defense in name alone. 
In virtually every state, a successful insanity 
defense does not bring freedom with it. Instead, 
it has become the occasion for either mandatory 
commitment to a mental hospital or for an 
exercise of discretion by the court regarding the 
advisability of such commitment. And because the 
commitment is for treatment, it continues until 
such time as the hospital authorities conclude 
the patient is ready for release, 
(continued) 
- 2 -
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R. D. MacKay, Post-Hinckley Insanity in the U.S.A., 1988 Crim. L. 
Rev. 88 (hereinafter "MacKay"). Unfortunately, the Utah Legislature 
responded to the present-day controversy in an opposite manner than 
the House of Lords and severely restricted the use of evidence of 
insanity. Indeed, the current Utah statute is more restrictive and 
narrow than the rule in effect in England in 1843, despite extensive 
advances in our understanding of the human mind and significant 
broadening of the concept of insanity since that time. 
Appellants contend that the Utah Legislature has 
overstepped its ability to pass laws and thereby violated due 
process by precluding criminal defendants from presenting an 
affirmative defense of insanity. Such a defense is fundamental to 
notions of fairness, decency and justice and incorporated in the 
concepts of state and federal due process. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this case involve questions of 
law. See Appellant's opening brief at 3. 
(footnote 1 continued) 
Goldstein at 19. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 
370, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3052, 3053, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (defendant 
found NGBRI can be committed based on verdict and can be held in "a 
mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or 
is no longer a danger to himself or society"). 
It is interesting to note that pursuant to due process, 
Utah's current statute may well limit the jury to a determination 
that a defendant is "not guilty" and preclude the use of "NGBRI" 
verdict form since the State has failed to prove an element of the 
crime. As Justice Durham noted in Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993) 
(Durham, J.)# "in Utah, a person found NGBRI is, in effect, not 
guilty because he or she did not possess the mental state required 
to commit the offense charged." 
- 3 -
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Fundamental fairness requires that persons who, as the 
result of mental illness, do not understand the wrongfulness of 
their conduct not be held criminally culpable. An affirmative 
defense of insanity was firmly ingrained in the criminal justice 
system at the time the federal constitution was adopted and has been 
embraced by the majority of the states. Federal due process 
requires that such an affirmative defense exist. 
Utah has shown a heightened and progressive awareness 
regarding the treatment of mentally ill persons and a broad and 
progressive application of the insanity defense. State due process 
requires that an affirmative defense of insanity exist. 
The State is relieved of its burden of proof, in violation 
of due process, where evidence of insanity is admissible only for 
purposes of negating the mens rea element. 
Appellant Herrera has standing to raise this issue. The 
statute is arbitrary and capricious in that it arbitrarily 
differentiates between delusional offenders. 
A defendant's right to due process and against 
self-incrimination is violated where such a defendant is allowed to 
introduce evidence of mental illness only for purposes of negating 
the mens rea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATES FEDERAL 
DUE PROCESS IN THAT IT ELIMINATES AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE OF INSANITY WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
- 4 
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Appellants' argument in this point is that federal due 
process requires that, at a minimum, criminal defendants have a 
right to present an insanity defense based on the M'Naghten test. 
Appellants claim that this minimum threshold test has been firmly 
ingrained in our criminal justice system and that an affirmative 
defense of insanity based on this test is fundamental to our 
system. Appellants are not asking this Court to draft a new rule or 
assess current, and perhaps fleeting, reactions to the use of this 
defense. Instead, Appellants are asking this Court to recognize 
that use of this minimum threshold test is so fundamental to our 
notions of fairness that it is protected by due process. 
To the extent that this Court agrees that such an 
affirmative defense is protected by due process, the State is not 
free to outlaw such a defense. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934). 
"The language of M'Naghten is fairly simple." Goldstein at 
45. The rule states: 
that to establish a defense on the ground of 
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the 
time of the committing of the act, the party 
accused was labouring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; 
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was 
doing what was wrong. 
Goldstein at 45 (emphasis added). 
The State claims that Utah's current statute allows a 
defense based on the first phrase of M'Naghten but disallows a 
defense based on the second phrase. State's brief at 19-20. The 
- 5 -
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State argues further that the current statute evidences an intent to 
relieve individuals from criminal culpability where they are not 
"responsible," but to not "exonerate"2 them based on a failure to 
know that the conduct was wrong. State's brief at 17-21. 
Even if the State were correct that our current statute 
encompasses the first phrase of M^Naghten, the statute nevertheless 
violates federal due process since both phrases are constitutionally 
mandated. Since the early 1800's, individuals who fit within either 
phrase were absolved of criminal culpability. The M'Naghten rule 
did not make a distinction between those who were not guilty due to 
insanity and those who would not be punished based on insanity. See 
State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1931). Instead, all persons 
who fit under either phrase were entitled to an acquittal. Id. 
The Green Court pointed out that while "[n]ot all persons 
who are afflicted with insanity, lunacy, idiocy or other unsoundness 
of mind are to be exonerated from punishment for their criminal 
acts," an individual is "entitled to an acquittal if at that time he 
was ... insane to such an extent that he either (1) did not know the 
nature of his act ... ; or (2) ... did not know that it was 
wrong ... ; or (3) ... was unable by reason of his mental disease to 
control his actions or impulses ... " (emphasis added). Hence, 
2. In attempting to make a distinction between the two phrases, the 
State appears to be referring to "exoneration from punishment" and 
not the more common meaning for the term "exoneration," i.e. relieve 
from blame. The State's distinctions without a difference further 
complicate an already complex area, and Appellants would urcje this 
Court not to adopt the State's labels for the two M'Naghten phrases. 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pursuant to Green, individuals who fit under either phrase were 
acquitted; those who fit under the second phrase were not merely 
"exonerated from punishment." 
In addition, it is not clear that Utah's current statute 
encompasses even the first phrase of the M'Naqhten rule. The first 
phrase absolves an individual where that individual did not know the 
nature and quality of his act. By contrast, a person acts 
"intentionally" "when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result," and "knowingly" when he 
is "aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances" and "aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result." Neither mental state encompasses the requirement 
that the individual be aware of the "quality" of his act, as is 
required by the first phrase of M'Naqhten. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103. 
Various courts have determined that the two phrases of 
M'Naqhten are indistinguishable, i.e. "that the ability to know the 
nature and quality of an act is indistinguishable from the ability 
to understand its wrongfulness." State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944, 
947 (Alaska 1987), disavowing its earlier reasoning to that effect 
in Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1002-3 (Alaska 1962), overruled in 
part on other grounds, Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 836 (Alaska 
1971), in light of express legislative history. In Jessner v. 
State, 231 N.W. 634, 639 (Wis. 1930), the Court stated that the two 
phrases in the M'Naghten test 
... express exactly the same thing, but in 
different language. They are synonomous, and 
their conjunctive use results only in emphasis. 
- 7 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If a person is unable to distinguish between 
right and wrong in respect to an act, he must be 
unaware of the nature and quality of the act 
which he is doing ..• . 
See also Maas v, Territory, 63 P. 960, 961 (Okla. 1901) ("knowledge 
of the wrongfulness of an act also embraces capacity to understand 
the nature and consequences of the same"). Assuming the two phrases 
of M'Naqhten are indistinguishable, Utah's negation of the mens rea 
statute does not cover the first phrase since it does not allow an 
insanity defense based on the actor's lack of knowledge as to the 
wrongfulness of his act. 
Further support for this concept that the two phrases of 
M'Naqhten are indistinguishable comes from the label generally given 
the test. Throughout case law and commentaries, the M'Naqhten test 
is referred to as the "right-wrong test" or by a similar term 
denoting the actor's knowledge of the wrongfulness of his or her 
conduct. See LaFave at 427, 436. These labels demonstrate that the 
essence of the M'Naqhten test is the actor's knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the conduct. Hence, Utah's statute does not permit 
an affirmative defense of insanity where an individual fits within 
the M'Naqhten test.3 
3. Although the language of the M'Naqhten rule is fairly simple, 
its meaning is not so straightforward. See Goldstein at 47. Little 
case law exists which explains the meaning of the two phrases. Id. 
at 23, 47-50; LaFave at 439. LaFave suggests that the paucity of 
case law explaining the meaning of the two M'Naqhten phrases "is 
probably due to the small percentage of defendants who raise an 
insanity defense and the extreme rarity of appeals by these 
defendants." LaFave at 439. While the precise meaning of the two 
phrases has not been extensively litigated, it is apparent that the 
rule protects individuals who do not know that their conduct is 
wrong. 
.
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The State relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 
L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)f in support of its argument that the statute does 
not violate federal due process. 
Foucha did not consider whether some form of affirmative 
insanity defense was constitutionally mandated. Instead, the Court 
held that a state violates due process where it continues to hold a 
defendant found NGBRI in a mental institution where the defendant is 
no longer mentally ill. 
Although the State emphasizes statements made in concurring 
opinions in Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (1992), it 
recognizes that these statements are dicta. State's brief at 
21-23. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was not 
joined by any justices; the Chief Justice joined Justice Kennedy's 
dissent. Hence, a majority of the Court has not embraced the dicta 
in Foucha cited by the State. 
As Appellants pointed out in their opening brief, the 
United States Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue 
of whether federal due process requires that a defendant be able to 
present a defense of insanity other than the ability to negate the 
mens rea. See Appellants' opening brief at 16-17. Case law from 
the United States Supreme Court does suggest, however, that insane 
persons are not criminally culpable and that a distinction exists 
between lack of mens rea and an insanity defense. See Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed.2d 1302 (1952); 
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1968); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 923-6 (Idaho 1990) 
(McDevitt, J., dissenting). 
This Court has also never addressed the issue raised in 
this part. Although it has affirmed convictions of mentally ill 
offenders, none of these defendants claimed that pursuant to federal 
due process they were permitted to present an affirmative defense of 
insanity. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993); State v. 
DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 
27, 29 (Utah 1990). 
In State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 383-4 (Justice Durham 
dissenting and concurring, joined by Justices Stewart and 
Zimmerman), a majority of this Court recognized that under the Utah 
statute, 
a defendant found NGBRI is, in effect, not guilty 
because he or she did not possess the mental 
state required to commit the offense charged. 
There is no assessment of a defendant's capacity 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her 
conduct or to conform his or her behavior to the 
requirements of law. A good deal of critical 
commentary has been directed at this approach, 
see, e.g., R. D. MacKay at 92, but the 
legislature has maintained it through recent 
revisions of the statute. 
Appellants are now asking that this Court consider for the 
first time the constitutionality of Utah's much criticized statute, 
and hold that an affirmative defense of insanity is so fundamental 
to our system of justice that it is incorporated in the concept of 
federal due process. 
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POINT II. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME DENIES 
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
The historical treatment of the mentally ill in Utah 
demonstrates a heightened awareness of the lack of responsibility or 
"accountability" of such persons.4 
In addition to the request by Governor George Woods in 1872 
that Utah address the problems of the mentally ill, quoted on 
page 32 of Appellant's opening brief, Governor George W. Emery made 
the following statement to the legislative assembly on January 11, 
1876: 
We need a Territorial Asylum for the 
insane, which will afford this class of 
unfortunate people proper treatment, at the 
public expense unless they are possessed of 
sufficient means to defray the necessary charges 
attending their case. Such an institution is 
indispensible in every State and Territory and 
should be under the control of a skillful 
physician, who has had experience in treating 
this class of patients. Humanity and wise 
government, alike, seem to require of us such a 
provision, and I suggest some action be taken by 
you looking to the establishment of such an 
institution even if it be on a limited scale, 
though adequate to the present wants of our 
people. 
23 Utah Historical Quarterly 302 (1955). 
The governor made this request for a territorial asylum 
even though Salt Lake City had opened a mental institution at the 
mouth of Emigration Canyon in 1869. R. D. Poll, Utah/s 
4. The historical information in this reply brief supplements the 
historical information outlined in Appellants' opening brief at 
32-37. 
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History 285 (1989) (hereinafter "Utah's History"). In 1879, 
Dr. Seymour Young, a trained medical doctor and nephew to Brigham 
Young, purchased the Salt Lake City institution and thereafter ran 
it "under contract of the city," Id.5 
In 1880, the Utah territorial legislature authorized the 
Utah Territorial Insane Asylum. The legislature intended "that the 
territorial facility be modern in every regard." Lester E. 
Bush, Jr., Health and Medicine Among the Latter-Day Saints: Science, 
Sense and Scripture 119 (1993) (hereinafter "Health and Ktedicine"). 
"When the Territorial Asylum opened in July 1885, it was heralded as 
incorporating all the improvements, conveniences and appointments of 
a modern asylum." Id., quoting Charles R. McKell, "The Utah State 
Hospital: A Study in the Care of the Mentally 111," Provo Papers, 
1 October 1976, pp. 6-28, originally published in 23 Utah Historical 
Quarterly (1955). In addition, Dr. Walter R. Pike, who "was 
probably the most qualified person in the territory," was appointed 
as the first superintendent. Health and Medicine at 119. Hence, 
prior to statehood, the government was providing funds and superior 
facilities and personnel for treatment of the mentally ill. This 
demonstrates an early, heightened concern for the treatment of the 
mentally ill. 
This early "commitment to the institutional approach to 
care" (Health and Medicine at 119) was "notable" in "that there was 
5. Articles written by Dr. Young "generally showed him to be 
current with recent developments in the field." Lester E. 
Bush, Jr., Health and Medicine Among the Latter-Day Saints: Science, 
Sense and Scripture 119 (1993). 
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so little opposition to defining individuals as mentally ill/ as 
opposed to being possessed of evil spirits or devils, given the 
general distrust of medicine and the emphasis upon the supernatural 
in every day life." Utah's History at 285. This early commitment 
to care for the mentally ill as opposed to a belief they were 
possessed by spirits also demonstrates the early progressiveness of 
Utah in this area. 
One of the first acts of the legislature after statehood 
was to take over control of the mental institution in Provo. Utah's 
History at 412. This also reflects the awareness of the importance 
of treatment for mentally ill persons. 
Almost ninety percent of the population of Utah were 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints at the 
time Utah achieved statehood. Utah's History at 397. Only 28 of 
the 107 participants in the constitutional convention held March 4 
through May 8, 1895 were non-Mormons. Hence, Mormon views on the 
treatment of the mentally ill should be considered in determining 
whether state due process guarantees an affirmative defense of 
insanity. 
Insane persons who "do not develop mentally to the point 
where they know right from wrong" are not accountable under Mormon 
doctrine. B. R. McConkie, Mormon Doctrine (2d ed. 1966) at 853. 
Considered at another level the ecclesiastical 
status within Mormonism of those who are mentally 
handicapped always has been clear. The notion 
implicit in LDS scripture that "accountability" 
was a prerequisite to baptism (or any other 
personal ordinance) was early understood to apply 
not just to young children but to any who were 
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mentally incapable of accepting responsibility 
for their own actions. Thus there has been no 
reguirement of baptism or any other formal 
ordinance for those who are either severely 
retarded or insane. 
Health and Medicine at 123 (emphasis added). 
This theme that insane persons are not accountable for 
their actions is apparent in other areas. In the context of 
suicide, Elder Bruce R. McConkie, a respected leader in the 
LDS Church, wrote in part: 
Suicide consists in the voluntary and intentional 
taking of one's own life, particularly where the 
person involved is accountable and has sound mind. 
... 
Obviously persons subject to great stresses may 
lose control of themselves and become mentally 
clouded to the point that they are no longer 
accountable for their acts. Such are not to be 
condemned for taking their own lives. 
Mormon Doctrine at 771 (emphasis added). 
Historically, Utah has shown a progressive approach for 
treatment of the mentally ill and a recognition that insane persons 
are not accountable for their actions. See Appellants7 opening 
brief at 32-37 for further discussion of the historical approach to 
insanity. The current statute, which precludes an insanity defense 
for persons who are not responsible or "accountable" for their 
actions, cuts against this historical concern for and progressive 
treatment of the mentally ill. 
Over the years, the judicial and statutory definitions of 
insanity have, for the most part, broadened as knowledge of mental 
processes has progressed. See Territory v. Catton, 16 P. 902, 907-8 
(1888), reversed on other grounds, 130 U.S. 83 (1889) (if individual 
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"with ability to refuse11 acts "with the knowledge that it is wrong, 
he is responsible" for his actions); State v. Mewhinney, 134 P. 632 
(Utah 1913) (M^Naghten test)6; State v. Green, 6 P.2d at 184-6 
(M'Naqhten plus inability to control actions or impulses); State v. 
Poulsonf 381 P.2d 93, 94-5 (Utah 1963) (upholding use of instruction 
outlining M'Naqhten and irresistible impulse tests); legislative 
adoption of Model Penal Code substantial capacity test, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-305 (1973); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 
1982) (recognizing that Utah broadened "the insanity test to conform 
to current accepted principles of moral responsibility; cf. State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d at 383-4 (Durham, J.) (noting that Utah's approach 
is not assessing defendant's capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law has been subject to 
criticism). 
The State points out that Utah's current statutory scheme 
holds "all defendants accountable when the prosecution establishes 
proof of the elements of the crime and by otherwise rejecting mental 
illness as a basis for exoneration." State's brief at 36. Holding 
insane defendants "accountable" cuts against the historical concern 
for and progressive treatment of mentally ill persons in this state 
and the fundamental and pervasive acceptance of the notion that 
6. In Mewhinney, the Court rejected the irresistible impulse test 
despite the "ability to refuse" language in Catton. In Green, 
6 P.2d at 189-6, the Court again included the lack of ability to 
control one's conduct. Mewhinney is perhaps the only example of the 
State narrowing the definition of insanity over the years. Other 
than Mewhinney, the judicial and statutory definitions broadened 
from territorial times until 1983. 
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insane persons are not "accountable." 
The Legislature cannot abrogate rights that are protected 
by due process. See generally Nebbia v. New Yorkf 291 U.S. 502 
(1934). The State's argument at 23, 29, 39 that defining the 
insanity defense is a legislative function disregards the due 
process limitations placed on any legislative act. 
Decisions cited by the State for the proposition that 
"other decisions [] have [] concluded that restriction of mental 
illness evidence is a constitutional legislative action" (State's 
brief at 39; see also State's brief at 23, 29) do not involve 
statutes which allow evidence of insanity solely for purposes of 
negating the mens rea. For instance, in United States v. Cameron, 
907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990) (cited in State's brief at 39), 
the Court discussed the Insanity Defense Reform Act which eliminated 
the "lack of volitional control" excuse, but retained the M'Naghten 
standard. See also Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 
1990)7 (holding that due process not violated where state disallows 
expert testimony as to whether defendant lacked required intent); 
7. The State relies on Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 
1990), in support of its argument that states are free to define 
insanity without any due process limitations. See State's brief at 
13, 29, 39. The issue in Haas was whether Wisconsin could disallow 
expert testimony offered by the defendant to establish that he was 
incapable of forming the necessary intent. In reaching its decision 
that precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the 
defendant could form the requisite mens rea did not violate: due 
process, the Court pointed out that "the issues of insanity and 
intent, although related, are not identical ... ." Id. at 396. 
Haas did not address the issue raised in these cases as to whether 
the State could restrict the insanity defense to negation of the 
mens rea element, and provides little support for the State's 
argument. 
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United States v. Pohlot# 827 F.2d 889, 895 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988) (discussing Insanity Defense Reform Act 
which retains M'Naqhten standard but deletes "volitional prong" of 
Model Penal Code); Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 659 (Alaska App. 
1985) (holding that elimination of "irresistible impulse" insanity 
defense does not violate due process); Hicks v. State, 352 S.E.2d 
762, 775 (Ga. 1987), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987) (upholding 
Georgia insanity defense which had right/wrong test and delusional 
compulsion test, but did not include "an impulse-control-disorder" 
insanity defense); State v. Turrentine, 730 P.2d 238, 242 (Ariz. 
App. 1986) (commenting that insanity defense which exonerates 
defendant from guilt "represents a public policy adopted by this 
state," and pointing out that finding defendant NGBRI under 
M'Naqhten test is distinct from mens rea element). 
POINT III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 IS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
(Reply to Point IV of Appellee's Brief) 
A. APPELLANT HERRERA HAS STANDING. 
The State challenges Defendant Herrera's standing to raise 
this issue but apparently does not challenge Defendant Sweezey's 
standing. State's brief at 44-6. 
Dr. LeBegue holds the opinion that Appellant Herrera 
suffered from a mental disease at the time of the offense and "would 
qualify for an affirmative defense of insanity as that defense 
existed in Utah prior to 1983." RH. 160. At the time of the 
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hearings in the trial court, Dr. LeBegue was "unable to state with 
certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense of 
insanity as presently defined." RH. 160. Defense counsel proffered 
that 
He is mentally ill, your Honor. He is a paranoid 
schizophrenic. He experiences hallucinations. 
RH. 386; see also 450. In addition, Appellant Herrera amended his 
plea to not guilty or, in the alternative, NGBRI. R. 374. 
Although the State ultimately conceded standing in some 
areas, it initially argued 
As to the standing issue, what the State's 
position would be is that to establish standing 
sufficient to raise the constitutionality of 
these statutes, that the defendant must show that 
he is mentally ill and that that mental illness 
does not fit within the current legal definition 
as stated under 76-2-305; that because no facts 
have been proferred that this Court doesn't have 
any basis to conclude whether or not the 
defendant has raised any relevant issue. 
Later, in arguing over the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the State claimed: 
Your Honor, again, at the time Dr. LeBegue 
testified and at the time the defendant made the 
strategy decision not to allow him to testify 
fully, all that needed to be set forth at that 
time was the fact that Mr. Herrera was delusional 
and why that would make any difference under the 
current statute as opposed to previous law. It 
was a due process argument that they were 
raising. And to have him state in relationship 
to such, as his testimony, that had to do with 
delusional offenders which, as I remember 
Dr. LeBegue's testimony, was the only thing where 
there might be some shift from prior law to 
current law. He simply never put Mr. Herrera in 
that category; nor was it proper to put him in 
that category. 
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R. 450-1. 
The argument in the trial court appears to have been about 
whether or not the State was entitled to an opportunity to 
cross-examine Appellant Herrera's expert witness, R. 448-52, 456. 
Defense counsel was concerned about the unlimited cross-examination 
the trial judge would allow, and despite the State's argument to the 
contrary, Appellant Herrera made an adequate showing that he was 
mentally ill and would have been entitled to assert the insanity 
defense under the former law.8 
As Appellant Herrera argued in the trial court, the facts 
of the case as known at that point, R. 60-61, the proffer of 
Dr. LeBegue and the affidavit of Dr. LeBegue, show that Appellant 
Herrera has standing. In raising the issue in the trial court, 
defense counsel relied on the suggestions in State v. Rhoades, 809 
P.2d 455, 459-60 (Idaho 1991). 
In Rhoades, the Court recognized that Appellant Herrera 
need not present an opinion on the ultimate issue of sanity in order 
to raise a claim. Instead, an expert opinion that sanity might be 
an issue in the case or "an assertion by counsel that he was raising 
the defense of insanity." 809 P.2d at 459. Live testimony was not 
a requirement. Summary affidavits from the expert or, in the 
8. Regardless of whether Appellant Herrera could assert the defense 
under the current law, the current statute severely limits the 
defense and precludes the jury from finding Appellant Herrera NGBRI 
in the event he is unable to negate the mens rea but able to 
establish that he did not know that the act was wrong. Hence, he 
has a claim regardless of whether he is also mentally ill under the 
current statute. 
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alternative, an in camera review of an affidavit by an expert appear 
sufficient under Rhoades. 
B. THE STATUTE ARBITRARILY DIFFERENTIATES 
BETWEEN DELUSIONAL OFFENDERS. 
As Dr. LeBegue testified, individuals who suffer from the 
same type and severity of mental illness are treated differently 
under the statute. Appellant's opening brief at 44-6. 
As Appellants outlined in their opening brief, a defendant 
found "guilty and mentally ill" (GAMI) may nevertheless be 
imprisoned. Appellants' opening brief at 26-3 0. Any of the 
following determinations could result in imprisonment rather than 
hospitalization: (1) the defendant is not mentally ill at the time 
of sentencing; (2) at the time of sentencing, the defendant is 
currently mentally ill, but the various factors weigh in favor of 
incarceration rather than hospitalization; (3) the defendant has 
achieved "maximum benefit" (whatever that means). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-169-203.9 Hence, the GAMI statute severely limits the persons 
who will be hospitalized as the result of their mental illness. 
In addition, under the current mens rea insanity defense 
and the GAMI scheme, persons are held criminally culpable "who are 
mentally diseased and who cannot reasonably be used to serve the 
9. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(1)(b), the court can 
order that a GAMI defendant be "committed to the department for care 
and treatment ... for no more than 18 months, or until he has 
reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first" (emphasis added). 
Under this subsection, a GAMI defendant can be hospitalized for no 
more than 18 months before being transferred to the prison. 
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purposes of the criminal law." See generally Goldstein at 11-15 
(discussing how M'Naghten defense furthers criminal law goals of 
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation). 
Finally, the GAMI statute does not free an individual who 
is mentally nonresponsible from criminal culpability. Although a 
person found NGBRI under predecessor statutes could be hospitalized, 
a distinction between a conviction and a finding of NGBRI 
nevertheless existed. The advantage enjoyed by the person found 
NGBRI is that "he suffers no formal judgment of condemnation." 
Goldstein at 20. 
The existence of the GAMI statutory scheme fails to 
alleviate the due process violations caused by the current insanity 
defense. 
POINT IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 VIOLATES DUE 
PROCESS AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
(Reply to Point VI of Appellee's Brief) 
The current statutory scheme requires a defendant who 
desires to negate the mens rea requirement based on insanity to 
submit to a mental examination. Appellants' argument in this point 
is that such a requirement, where Appellants intend only to negate 
the mens rea element, violates due process and the fifth amendment. 
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 
L.Ed.2d 359, 370 (1981), a pre-Hinckley case, the Court stated in 
dictum: 
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Nor was the interview analogous to a sanity 
examination occasioned by a defendant's plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of 
his offense. When a defendant asserts the 
insanity defense and introduces supporting 
psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive 
the state of the only effective means it has of 
controverting his proof on an issue that he 
interjected into the case. Accordingly, several 
Courts of Appeals have held that, under such 
circumstances, a defendant can be required to 
submit to a sanity examination conducted by the 
prosecution's psychiatrist. [citations omitted] 
The dictum in Estelle refers to an affirmative defense of 
insanity, as universally followed at that time. A defense of 
insanity which entertained only the negation of the mens rea element 
was not codified until after Estelle was decided. Hence, the dictum 
in Estelle does not address the issue raised in this part. 
Nor did the defendant in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 472 
(Utah 1988), challenge the constitutionality of the examination 
procedure in light of the limited nature of the insanity defense 
available to him. Instead, Bishop claimed that he was not asserting 
a diminished capacity or insanity defense, and was introducing 
psychiatric testimony to establish that he had committed a 
manslaughter rather than an intentional homicide. 
Appellants have not "interjected" an affirmative defense of 
insanity into this case. Instead, they are claiming that requiring 
them to be examined where they intend to use mental state only to 
negate the mens rea element violates due process and the fifth 
amendment. 
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CONCUJSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellants Herrera and Sweezey 
respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial judges' 
orders denying their motions to "Declare Utah Statutory Scheme 
Unconstitutional" and remand the cases for trial in which Appellants 
are permitted to assert an affirmative defense of insanity. 
SUBMITTED this X3/JL day of September, 1993. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellants 
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